In this paper we present a semantic analysis of the imperfective paradox based on the Event Calculus (van Lambalgen & Hamm 2004), a planning formalism characterizing a class of models which can be computed by connectionist networks. We report the results of a questionnaire that support the semantic theory and suggest that different aspectual classes of VPs in the progressive give rise to different entailment patterns. Further, a processing model is outlined, combining the semantic analysis with the psycholinguistic principle of immediacy in the framework of recurrent networks. The model is used to derive predictions concerning the electrophysiological correlates of the computations described by the Event Calculus.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, a number of studies have brought experimental data to bear on semantic theories (see, for instance, the work on quantifiers by Geurts & van der Slik 2005 and McMillan et al. 2005 , 2006 . However, formal semantics and psycholinguistics have reached their most important results independently, even when the issues at stake could have been addressed more completely by joining efforts. One example is the study of discourse-based inference in psycholinguistics, where formal notions of truth, entailment and veridicality have often been neglected (see Cook et al. 2001 and Frank et al. 2003 among others) .
The assumption behind this paper is that there exists a relatively unexplored territory in which the two disciplines can interact productively. Here we consider a small portion of this territory: the imperfective paradox and its processing consequences. In the remainder of this section we provide a minimal methodological background against which semantic theories can be combined with processing models and we introduce the semantic paradox which we shall work with. In section 2 we present an analysis of the paradox based on the Event Calculus (van Lambalgen & Hamm 2004 ), a planning formalism characterizing a class of models which can be computed by connectionist networks. In section 3 we report the results of a questionnaire that support the semantic theory and suggest that different aspectual classes of VPs in the past progressive give rise to different entailment patterns. In section 4 a processing model is outlined, combining the formal semantic analysis with the psycholinguistic principle of immediacy in the framework of recurrent networks. The model is used to derive predictions concerning the electrophysiological correlates of the computations described by the Event Calculus.
Methodological preamble
From a semantic analysis of a given linguistic structure it is usually not possible to derive predictions concerning the complexity and time course of the processes involved in producing or comprehending utterances in which the structure occurs. Although there may be cases in which processing hypotheses can be formulated on the basis of the semantic theory alone (Geurts & van der Slik 2005; McMillan et al. 2005) , this approach is unlikely to work in general. The reason is that processing largely depends upon the particular algorithms and neural mechanisms that, in a physical system such as the human brain, compute the linguistic structures posited by the theory-or functionally equivalent structures. Because semantics typically does not describe algorithms and neural mechanisms (nor perhaps it should), there appears to be no direct way to relate semantic theories to what is observed in language-processing experiments.
The solution is to adopt a theoretical framework that allows formal semantic analyses to be explicitly related to processing algorithms inspired by the available psycholinguistic evidence and ultimately to mechanistic models of the kind investigated in neuroscience. Marr's (1982) scheme for the analysis of cognitive systems seems an appropriate choice in this regard.
Marr argued that information-processing systems should be understood at three nearly independent levels of analysis. The first level contains a description of the computations to be performed by the system and more precisely a characterization of the goals that have to be attained in order to solve the information-processing problem. For example, a sentence S can be seen as introducing a specific goal, namely, the construction of a cognitive model making S true. In the semantic analysis proposed below, the tense and aspect of VPs like the past progressive are treated as instructions to update the current discourse model so as to achieve that goal. We regard it as the task of semantics to describe information-processing goals and update instructions. The actual processing steps are described at the intermediate level, where constraint satisfaction algorithms, implemented in artificial neural networks (Marr & Poggio 1976) , and processing principles such as immediacy and incrementality are combined. Marr completes the picture with a third level, at which the neurobiological architecture is described. We discuss issues relevant for the computational level in section 2 and for the algorithmic level in section 4.
1.2 The imperfective paradox Vendler (1957) famously classified VPs as states ('know', 'love' etc.) , activities ('write', 'run' etc.) , accomplishments ('write a letter', 'run a mile' etc.) and achievements ('finish', 'reach' etc.) . We are concerned with the inferences licensed by sentences containing activities and accomplishments in the past progressive. The following example involves the accomplishment 'write a letter':
(1) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
From (1) the reader would typically conclude that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the girl attained the desired goal and would thus assent to the statement 'The girl has written a letter'. Such inference is based on the assumption that spilling coffee on the tablecloth is usually neutral with respect to the writing activity, that is it is not a typical immediate cause leading to its termination. It is possible to imagine scenarios in which writing is temporarily interrupted or even terminated by the accident. Nonetheless, as the data reported in section 3 will demonstrate, failing to explicitly mention a disabling condition in the discourse is sufficient for leading the reader to assume that there was no such obstacle to attaining the intended goal. Inferences to a goal state are non-monotonic, that is they can be suppressed if the discourse describes an event which terminates the relevant activity:
(2) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
Assuming that writing was intended to occur on the same paper sheets on which coffee was spilled, the accident is sufficient for terminating the activity and it is therefore a disabling condition for obtaining a complete letter. Accordingly, on the basis of (2) the reader would be more likely to assent to 'The girl has written no letter'.
One important observation is that suppression can obtain only with accomplishments and not with activities (Rothstein 2004) . Since a sentence containing an activity in the past progressive, such as 'writing letters', does not involve a canonical goal, it is interpreted as entailing that 'The girl has written one or more letters' regardless of the consequences of the second event on the writing activity:
(3) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth. (4) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
Upon reflection, there is something paradoxical about examples (1) and (2) which is not found in (3) and (4). Although it belongs to the meaning of the accomplishment 'writing a letter' that the writing activity is directed towards the goal state of a complete letter, the actual occurrence of that goal state can be denied without contradiction. But how can a seemingly essential component of the meaning be denied without affecting the meaning itself? This is known as the 'imperfective paradox'. The semantic literature is replete with attempted solutions of the paradox, ranging from explaining the problem away (Michaelis 2001) to various invocations of possible worlds (Dowty 1979; Landman 1992; de Swart 1998) . It is impossible to review all proposed solutions here. Instead, we will focus on some representative claims. Possible worlds analyses are based on the idea that . . . the progressive picks out a stage of a process/event which, if it does not continue in the real world, has a reasonable chance of continuing in some other possible world. (de Swart 1998) They differ however in the (largely informal) descriptions of the possible worlds used. For example, Dowty (1979) would claim that the following are equivalent: a. 'The girl is writing a letter' is true in the actual world; b. 'The girl will have written a letter' is true in all so-called 'inertia worlds', worlds which are identical with the present world until 'now', but then continue in a way most compatible with the history of the world until 'now'.
These approaches are intensional in the formal sense of using possible worlds. In fact, most authors (but not all) would agree that the progressive creates an intensional context: even though the accident in (2) may have terminated the writing activity at a stage in which it was unclear whether the girl was writing a letter or, say, a memo, still only one of (5) The girl was writing a letter. (6) The girl was writing a memo.
is true of the situation described by (2). Explicitly denying that the progressive creates an intensional context, Michaelis (2001) argues that 1 . . . the Progressive sentence 'She is drawing a circle' denotes a state which is a subpart not of the accomplishment type She-draw a circle but of the activity type which is entailed by the causal representation of the accomplishment type. Since this activity can be identified with the preparatory activity that circle drawing entails, circle drawing can in principle be distinguished from square drawing etc. within the narrow window afforded by the Progressive construal [and] does not require access to culmination points either in this world or a possible world.
We find this questionable, for without access to a person's intention it may be very hard to tell initially whether she is drawing a circle or a square, writing a letter or a memo. But that person's intention in performing an activity is characterized precisely by the associated consequent state, even though the latter cannot yet be inferred from the available data. Here the Event Calculus will come to our rescue because the notion of goal or intention is built into the semantics from the start. In particular, the meaning of a VP is represented by a scenario which describes a plan for reaching the goal. However, unlike approaches such as Parsons ' (1990) where one quantifies existentially over events, the scenario is a universal theory and does not posit the occurrence of the intended consequences. Although the plan is appropriate for that purpose, attaining the goal is guaranteed only in a minimal model (in which no unforeseen obstacles occur) of the scenario plus the axioms of the Event Calculus. The meaning of an accomplishment (as embodied in the scenario) involves a culminating event type, which therefore must exist; but no existential claims are made concerning the corresponding event token, which, as in example (2), may also fail to occur. Type and token are handled by different mechanisms in the Event Calculus. These notions form the basis of our semantic analysis of the imperfective paradox, to which we now turn.
SEMANTIC ANALYSIS
The reference to goal states in the preceding section suggests that a semantic analysis of the progressive can be based on a planning formalism which is able to talk about goals and actions and which includes a theory of causality together with a principle of inertia (Hamm & van Lambalgen 2003) . Such a formalism is presented in van Lambalgen & Hamm (2004) . It consists of an Event Calculus which has found applications in robotics, reformulated using the computational machinery of Constraint Logic Programming.
The reader may wonder why planning can provide a source of inspiration to linguistics. The reason can be found in the nature of planning computations, which typically proceed as follows. First a goal is specified, which may be an action to be performed at a particular location (e.g. pick up outgoing mail in an office building). Next a plan is computed, that is a sequence of actions to get to the required location, derived by backward chaining from the goal to obtain a sequence of subgoals, the last one of which can be executed in the agent's initial position and state. Planning requires a situation model (including a map of the building, a causal theory of the agent's actions, a specification of values of variables such as 'door open/closed', the agent's initial position and state and a record of its past and current actions), a repertoire of possible actions ('follow wall' and 'go through door') and observations ('door open/closed'). While the agent executes the plan, it also registers its observations and actions in the situation model; knowledge of its actions may be important for the agent to estimate its current position. Particularly relevant for our purposes is that a plan might have to be re-computed in mid-course when the initial situation model is updated due to new observations (for instance, a closed door which was expected to be open on the basis of the initial model or a wrong estimate of the agent's current position). Later on we shall see how this 're-computation' relates to the imperfective paradox.
This short description should be sufficient for enabling the reader to see the connection with language processing. The comprehender starts with an initial discourse model, in which an incoming sentence or clause must be integrated. Suppose the main verb of the sentence is non-stative, for instance, an activity. If the sentence is in one of the simple tenses, it is unpacked in the relevant action and its participants, and the discourse model is updated accordingly. This is the analogue of updating the situation model with representations of individuals and actions in planning. In more complex cases, such as sentences involving accomplishments like (1) and (2), the VP is taken to express the existence of a goal-directed plan. If, on the contrary, the main verb of the sentence is stative, the sentence can be viewed as analogous to an observation report, and the discourse model is updated with a property.
The Event Calculus
The Event Calculus is a planning formalism which allows one to talk about actions, goals and causal relations in the world. Its main function is to return a plan given a goal, the initial state and causal relations. Formally, the Event Calculus is a many-sorted predicate logic. It has two different sorts for events, viewed either perfectively or imperfectively. The former are called event types and are symbolized by e, e#, . . ., e 0 , . . .. The latter are called fluents (Newton's name for timedependent variables) and are symbolized by f, f#, . . ., f 0 , . . .. One may think of event types as action types, such as, for example 'break' or 'ignite'; fluents can be thought of as time-dependent properties, such as 'being broken' or 'writing'; the time parameter in fluents is implicit, but they can have further parameters (for instance, for the subject of 'writing'). The real distinction between event types and fluents comes from the different roles they play in the axioms of the Event Calculus. The universe also contains sorts for individuals ('the girl'), real numbers interpreted as instants of time, and various other real quantities (such as position, velocity and degree of some quality).
The primitive predicates comprise the minimum necessary to talk about two forms of causality, instantaneous (as in a collision) and continuous (as when a force is acting): (7) a. Initially(f): 'fluent f holds at the beginning of the discourse' b. Happens(e, t): 'event type e has a token at time t' c. Initiates(e, f, t): 'the effect of event type e at time t is the initiation of f ' d. Terminates(e, f, t): 'the effect of event type e at time t is the termination of f ' e. Trajectory(
Releases(e, f, t): 'event type e releases the continuously-varying fluent f' 2 g. HoldsAt(f, t): 'fluent f holds at at time t'
While (7a-d) are the predicates required by instantaneous change, (7e-f) are used to model continuous change. Three further notions will be used in the semantic analysis presented below. The first is that of scenario.
3 Whereas the axiom system EC provides a macro-theory of causality, scenarios provide micro-theories stating the specific causal relations obtaining in a given situation. Scenarios can be used to describe the causal environment of actions and events at the level of granularity expressed in natural language, such as, for instance, writing a letter or drawing a circle. Scenarios can be taken to represent, in a tenseless fashion, the meaning of VPs. For instance, the scenario for the accomplishment 'writing a letter' specifies that the writing activity is causally related to the amount of letter produced, that the termination of the activity is temporally contiguous to the completion of the letter and so on.
The second notion is that of integrity constraint. As we said above, we regard a sentence as introducing an information-processing goal ('Make S true') to be achieved by updating the current discourse model or constructing a new one. Integrity constraints regiment such updates. They can take the form of either obligations '?u succeeds', requesting an update of the discourse model satisfying u, or prohibitions '?u fails', blocking updates of the discourse model satisfying u. While scenarios describe the meaning of VPs in a tenseless fashion, integrity constraints specify the contribution of tense, aspect and temporal adjuncts to the semantics of VPs.
The third notion is that of minimal model. The axioms of the Event Calculus constitute a correct theory of causality if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The discourse model contains only those occurrences of events forced to be there by the discourse and the axioms; 2. The interpretation of the primitive predicates is as small as is consistent with the discourse and the axioms.
These two requirements define minimal models. They imply that no unforeseen events are allowed to happen and that all causal influences are as expected. The choice to work with minimal models instead of all models leads to non-monotonicity in discourse interpretation: adding a new sentence or clause to the discourse may invalidate a conclusion derived from the initial model. In van Lambalgen & Hamm (2004) it is argued that it is precisely the possibility to retract previously inferred conclusions which allows a rigorous treatment of the imperfective paradox. The most important meta-theorem concerning the EC formalism is that minimal models exist and can be computed efficiently (van Lambalgen & Hamm 2004; Stenning & van Lambalgen 2005 , 2007 . Furthermore, minimal models can be computed (or approximated, depending on the expressiveness of the logical language) by connectionist networks-a topic to which we return in section 4.3.
The semantics of the progressive
The semantics of the VP 'was writing a letter' can be decomposed into the tenseless lexical meaning of 'write a letter' and the temporal and aspectual contribution of the past progressive. The lexical meaning is represented by the following scenario:
Here write is the activity fluent, letter(x) is a parametrized fluent for the completion stage x of the letter, a is a constant for the stage at which writing is initiated, c is a constant for the stage at which the letter is considered finished and letter(c) is the fluent for the goal state. The dynamics of the scenario is formalized by (8g), which says that, if the stage of completion of the letter at time t is x, then the writing activity, lasting from time t until t + d, will result in a letter whose stage of completion at time
, where g is a monotone increasing, time-dependent, real-valued function relating the activity to the completion stage. 5 Accomplishments are distinguished from activities by the statements regimenting the behaviour of the goal state, here (8c) and (8e): because no canonical goal is involved in activities such as 'write letters', their scenario will not contain these clauses. 4 See Andrade-Lotero (2006) for the algorithms deriving scenarios from Discourse Representation Structures in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981) and from constructions in Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995) . 5 The way g is defined depends upon the particular VP (or, equivalently, the particular plan) at issue. For instance, 'erasing the blackboard' or 'dismantling the engine' may be represented using a monotone decreasing function.
The contribution of the past progressive is represented by the integrity constraint (9) ?HoldsAt(write, R)^R < S succeeds which forces an update of the discourse model such that the activity fluent write holds at the reference time R located in the past of the moment of speech S (Reichenbach 1947). As we noted above about examples (1)-(4), different inferences can be drawn from activities and accomplishments in the past progressive. In the Event Calculus, this follows from the fact that updating the initial model according to (9) leads to different models depending on whether the scenario represents an activity or an accomplishment. Proposition 1 provides information on the inferences licensed by a discourse containing an accomplishment in the past progressive.
Proposition 1. Let D be a discourse consisting of scenario (8) given above. Suppose D is extended to D# so that the query ?HoldsAt (write, R)^R < S succeeds in D#. Suppose also lim t/N gðtÞ > c. Then there is a unique minimal model of D# and in this model there is a time t > R for which HoldsAt(letter(c),t). By virtue of the stipulation Letter(letter(c),t), there will be a letter at time t.
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If write holds at R, as required by (9), it must either hold initially or have been initiated. The latter requires an event start which initiated the writing activity. Since the starting event is not provided by discourse, we must assume that write holds initially. The clause (8g) states that the writing activity will increase the stage of completion of the letter. As time tends to infinity, the latter will be at least equal to c (the final completion stage). We have stipulated that a letter whose stage of completion is c is a finished letter. Hence, there must be a time at which the letter is considered finished. The writing activity will stop as soon as a complete letter is obtained, as is guaranteed by (8d-e). Notice that this holds for accomplishments but not for activities: if the VP is the activity 'writing letters', (8c) and (8e) are not part of the scenario and writing will continue also after one letter has been completed-in fact, it will continue indefinitely, if no terminating event is described.
We have just seen how the Event Calculus deals with the interpretation of VPs in the past progressive. We will now discuss the contribution of subordinate 'when' clauses to the meaning of (1)-(4). Because spilling coffee on the tablecloth usually does not terminate the writing activity, the dynamics of the scenario will lead to a complete letter in (1) and to an indefinite number of letters in (3). The argument mirrors the one given above as a gloss of Proposition 1. The situation is different for examples (2) and (4). Spilling coffee on the paper is typically sufficient for terminating the writing activity. This bit of world knowledge can be expressed by the following addition to scenario (8):
(10) Terminates (spill, write, t) But what is more important here is the integrity constraint introduced by the 'when' clause (11) ?Happens(spill, R)^R < S succeeds which requires the accident to occur at R, while the writing activity was taking place. Since during the writing process there is no complete letter (yet), spilling coffee on the paper will terminate the activity before the letter is finished. Therefore, there will be no complete letter in the final discourse structure. As for (4), the theory is consistent both with the situation in which the writing activity was terminated before even a single letter had been completed and with the case in which one or more letters were finished when the accident happened. The proposed semantics predicts that readers would assent to 'The girl has written a letter' in (1), to 'The girl has written no letter' in (2) and to 'The girl has written one or more letters' in (3). This is consistent with received semantic wisdom about entailments of activities and accomplishments in the progressive. Behavioral data supporting this claim are presented in the next section.
To summarize, the attainment of the consequent state can be derived in a minimal model of a discourse containing an accomplishment in the progressive. However, the computation of discourse models is non-monotonic: if the minimal model is extended with a sentence or a clause describing an event which terminates the relevant activity (what we called a disabling condition), the derivation of the goal state is blocked. Non-monotonicity affords a neat solution of the imperfective paradox, as there is no contradiction in assuming that the representation of the goal state is both essential to the meaning of the progressive VP (as an event type in the scenario) and suppressible on the basis of additional discourse information (as an event token in the minimal model).
BEHAVIOURAL DATA
In the preceding sections we have argued that accomplishments and activities in the past progressive behave differently as regards entailment.
An accomplishment such as 'writing a letter' implies that 'The girl has written a letter' provided that no obstacles are described in discourse. Failing to mention a disabling condition is sufficient for inferring that there is no such obstacle to attaining the goal. If, however, a disabling condition is introduced, the accomplishment will imply that 'The girl has written no letter'. An activity such as 'writing letters' implies that 'The girl has written one or more letters' regardless of further discourse information. Since disabling conditions affect the possibility of attaining a predefined goal, and such predefined goals are part of the meaning of accomplishments but not of activities, accomplishments will be sensitive to the presence of a disabling condition in the discourse context, whereas activities will not. We administered an entailment questionnaire aimed at testing this claim.
Subjects
Thirty-two native speakers of Dutch (mean age 22.5, 27 female) completed the cloze probability test (see below) and 36 (mean age 22.5, 28 female) the entailment questionnaire. Participants were selected from the database of the F.C. Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging in Nijmegen. The two sets of subjects were disjoint.
Materials
The set of Dutch materials used in the tests included 160 items. Each item comprised two context sentences (C) providing a neutral setting for the events described by critical sentences, 7 four critical sentences (S1)-(S4) and two probe pairs (P1)-(P2): (C) De deur van de woonkamer was gesloten. Binnen speelde de radio klassieke muziek. The door of the living-room was PST closed PRT . Inside played PST the radio classical music. 'The door of the living room was closed PST PRT . Inside the radio played PST classical music'. (S1) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste. The girl was PST letters on the to-write INF when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled PST . 'The girl was writing PST PRG letters when her friend spilled PST coffee on the tablecloth'.
(S2) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste. The girl was PST letters on the to-write INF when her friend coffee on the paper spilled PST . 'The girl was writing PST PRG letters when her friend spilled PST coffee on the paper'. (S3) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
The girl was PST a letter on the to-write INF when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled PST . 'The girl was writing PST PRG a letter when her friend spilled PST coffee on the tablecloth'. (S4) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
The girl was PST a letter on the to-write INF when her friend coffee on the paper spilled PST . 'The girl was writing PST PRG a letter when her friend spilled PST coffee on the paper.' (P1) Het meisje heeft een of meer brieven geschreven.
The girl has PRS one or more letters written PRT . 'The girl has written PRS PRF one or more letters'. Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven. The girl has PRS no letter written PRT . 'The girl has written PRS PRF no letter'. (P2) Het meisje heeft een brief geschreven.
The girl has PRS a letter written PRT . 'The girl has written PRS PRF a letter'. Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven. The girl has PRS no letter written PRT . 'The girl has written PRS PRF no letter'.
Critical sentences were constructed manipulating the aspectual class of the VP in the past progressive (activity or accomplishment) and the causal type of the condition introduced by the subordinate 'when' clause (neutral or disabling with respect to the event described in the progressive clause). Activities and accomplishments differed only in the object NP: an indefinite ('een brief ') was used for accomplishments, a bare plural ('brieven') was used for activities. Disabling and neutral conditions differed only in the prepositional or object NP, for instance, 'papier' for the former and 'tafelkleed' for the latter. The distinction between neutral and disabling conditions was made according to the authors' judgment. The probes (P1) were used with activities, (P2) with accomplishments.
The following linguistic properties of critical sentences were normed. The mean length and the raw frequency of the differing words in the NP of subordinate 'when' clauses were matched using the CELEX corpus (Baayen et al. 1996) . To determine the cloze probabilities of the verbs in the subordinate clauses, context items followed by a critical sentence with the final word blanked were presented to subjects. Participants were asked to fill in the blank with the first word that came to their mind. Four versions (40 items per condition) randomized and balanced across conditions were constructed. Mean cloze probabilities are not different across conditions (T-tests, all comparisons P > 0.05). This was established for each version as well as for the entire set of experimental items. Therefore, the same materials and test versions were used in the entailment questionnaire.
Procedure
Copies of the questionnaire were distributed to all subjects in the database meeting the following criteria: they had to be native speakers of Dutch with an age between 18 and 50 and with no history of neurological, psychiatric or cognitive disorders. The first 36 subjects who returned a completed questionnaire were included in the analysis.
The first page of each booklet contained the test instructions. Participants were informed that the questionnaire consisted of 160 short texts and that each comprised three sentences (the two context sentences and the critical sentence) and was followed by a pair of probes. Subjects were instructed to read each sentence carefully and select the probe which they deemed correct on the basis of their expectations ('verwachtingen') about the continuation of the text ('over het verlog van de tekst'). Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible and to write a brief comment on their answer in the blank space following the probes.
The reference to 'expectations' in the test instructions requires some explanation. Notice that we are not interested in what 'subjects semantically know' given a progressive clause-presumably that the writing activity was taking place some time in the past and that only a part of the letter was then completed. For this would amount to asking subjects what is true at the reference time, which is captured by the integrity constraint (9) above and requires no inference based on the relevant models. Rather, we are interested in what subjects infer about the outcome of an action described using the progressive. That is, we want to know how subjects reason about goals and, more precisely, what is the projected course of events after the reference time. In order to accomplish this, we constructed the probe pairs (P1) and (P2) using the Dutch present perfect (which focuses on the present consequences of a past event), we avoided probes of the form 'The girl has written a part of the letter' and we asked subjects to decide which of the two probes (positive or negative) matched their expectations about the continuation of the narrative. Participants' written explanations provide no evidence that (P1) and (P2) were insufficient for giving accurate responses such that, for instance, a probe of the form 'It is unclear whether the girl has written a letter' was necessary. Rather, subjects' comments suggest that, if the discourse implied that only a part of the letter was completed, as in (S4), then the negative probe in (P2) had to be selected.
Data analysis
Subject-based and item-based statistical analyses were carried out. For the former, we used a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) model with Subject as the random effect, Aspectual Class (Activity or Accomplishment) and Condition Type (Neutral or Disabling) as fixed effects and the mean number of negative responses (i.e. of negative probes chosen as responses) as the dependent variable. To generalize over both subjects and test items, 8 we employed a parallel repeatedmeasures ANOVA model in which Test Item (as defined above, i.e. as a set of context, critical and probe sentences) was the random effect, Aspectual Class and Condition Type were the fixed effects and the mean number of negative respondents (subjects giving a negative response) was the dependent variable. Univariate F-tests were computed in both cases.
Results
The subject-based analysis revealed significant effects of Aspectual Class and Condition Type and a significant interaction between the two factors (see Table 1 ). Neutral activities (S1) had the lowest mean of negative responses (M ¼ 2.72, SD ¼ 3.22), followed by disabled activities (S2) (M ¼ 8.06, SD ¼ 7.05), neutral accomplishments (S3) (M ¼ 10.03, SD ¼ 9.23) and disabled accomplishments (S4) (M ¼ 25.14, SD ¼ 8.02). Except for neutral activities (S1), the distribution of the data in the different conditions appears rather similar, as indicated by standard deviations (SDs) and box height and whisker length in Figure 1a . Figure 1b shows that the pattern of responses appears as predicted by the theory: accomplishments are more sensitive than activities to the presence of a disabling condition in the discourse context. A similar pattern of effects was revealed by the item-based analysis (Table 1) . Neutral activities (S1) had the lowest mean of negative respondents (M ¼ 2.35, SD ¼ 4.13), followed by disabled activities (S2) (M ¼ 7.13, SD ¼ 7.24), neutral accomplishments (S3) (M ¼ 9.54, SD ¼ 7.09) and disabled accomplishments (S4) (M ¼ 22.62, SD ¼ 9.04). In the preceding sections we have proposed an analysis of the imperfective paradox based on the Event Calculus and we have presented some behavioural data supporting the theory. Recall that we chose to design the semantic theory as a computational analysis in Marr's sense. We are now ready to move on to the intermediate level of analysis and consider the processing steps subserving the computation of discourse models. The processing model is based on the combination of the Event Calculus and Constraint Logic Programming used in van Lambalgen & Hamm (2004) . The algorithms presented there specify in an abstract manner the computational steps involved in satisfying integrity constraints or, more precisely, they spell out the derivation (the proof) of a given statement within the theory. In order to derive predictions about the complexity and the time course of the relevant computations, it is necessary to add an explicit processing component to the formal machinery of the Event Calculus: the principle of immediacy.
The principle of immediacy
In a paper discussing language-processing models and their neural implementation, Hagoort (2006) proposed 'six general architectural principles for comprehension beyond the word level'. One of these, also known as the 'principle of immediacy', is particularly relevant in this context. Immediacy has often been debated in the psycholinguistic literature (Marslen-Wilson 1989; Jackendoff 2002) , where it is viewed as a hypothesis about the time course of the access and integration of lexical meanings in a sentence structure and is contrasted with syntaxfirst models (Frazier 1987; Friederici 2002) . Immediacy is defined by Hagoort (2006) This general statement cannot be directly related to our Event Calculus analysis. The reason is that it refers only to lexical integration and not to the computation of denotations and discourse models. Hagoort's notion of immediacy is sufficient for deriving processing predictions concerning semantic composition. However, to be relevant for describing the construction of discourse models, the principle of immediacy must be thus reformulated:
Proposition 2. The algorithms updating a minimal model so as to satisfy an integrity constraint are executed as soon as the integrity constraint is given as input.
The proposed definition of immediacy is a general hypothesis about the time course of the construction of discourse representations: it states that minimal models are computed as soon as update instructions, in the form of integrity constraints, are fed into the system by relevant lexical and morphosyntactic material. Propositions 1 and 2 form the core of our processing model.
The re-computation hypothesis
Let us now consider the processing steps leading to the construction of discourse models for (S3) and (S4). The first update instruction, in the form of integrity constraint (9), is introduced by the progressive VP. Since at that stage the information provided by discourse amounts to the context (C) and the main (progressive) clause of (S3) or (S4), no obstacle for the writing activity is described. Proposition 2 implies that (9) is satisfied as soon as the progressive VP is processed and Proposition 1 guarantees that a minimal model is computed such that there is a time at which the goal state holds. The upshot is that, when an accomplishment in the progressive is processed, a minimal model is immediately computed in which the goal state holds.
Considering the subordinate clause, we must distinguish two processing steps. The first is carried out by adding (10) to the scenario (8), updating the discourse model according to (11) and deriving the existence of a time later than the initiation of the writing activity at which writing was terminated. The second step computes the suppression of the goal state inference by deriving the further statement that there is no time at which a complete letter was obtained. These are two distinct operations: for activities that are terminated by a disabling condition, such as (S2), only the first step is carried out when the subordinate is processed because there is no goal state to be cancelled; for disabled accomplishments, such as (S4), both steps are implemented. Recall that the satisfaction of the goal state is derived in a minimal model of the progressive VP. As a consequence, the hypothesis licensed by the theory is that, when an accomplishment in the progressive is followed by a subordinate clause describing a disabling condition, the initial minimal model is re-computed to the effect that, in the new discourse structure, there is no time at which the goal state holds.
Re-computation is thus the main processing consequence of the imperfective paradox. Predictions concerning the complexity and the time course of semantic computations for sentences like (S1)-(S4) can be derived from our processing model. The theory implies that the subordinate clause in (S4) involves the re-computation of the minimal model computed while processing the progressive clause, while in (S3) the initial model is simply extended (we return to the difference between 're-computation' and 'extension' in 4.3). Furthermore, the activity cases (S1) and (S2) will also involve a monotonic extension of the initial model, such that the termination of the writing activity is computed for (S2), but no cancellation of the goal state (since a canonical goal is not involved in activities). In short, the subordinate clause in (S4) will be more complex to process compared to (S1)-(S3), as no re-computation is triggered in the latter conditions. As regards time courses, the Event Calculus requires the causal and temporal information carried by the verb 'morste' to activate the additional scenario clause (10), satisfy (11) and derive the failed occurrence of the consequent state. Therefore, re-computation is expected to surface only at the final word in (S4).
Re-computation and perceptron learning
The reader might wonder why computing a model that is incompatible with a previous structure (re-computation) would be different from, and in particular more complex than, computing a minimal model that monotonically extends the initial one. The answer can be found in the behaviour of the neural networks that compute minimal models. Due to the syntactic restrictions inherent in Logic Programming (Doets 1994 ), the models characterized by the Event Calculus can be viewed as stable states of the associated neural networks. It has been demonstrated that recurrent neural networks are sufficient and suitable for computing minimal models for propositional logic programs (Stenning & van Lambalgen 2005 , 2007 . It has also been shown that, for any propositional logic program, there exists a three-layer feedforward network of binary threshold units that computes the semantic operators on which the construction of minimal models is based (Hitzler et al. 2004) . The language underlying the Event Calculus is not propositional but is a many-sorted predicate logic (see section 2.1), with matters being complicated further by the use of integrity constraints. Recent research suggests, however, that recurrent networks can also approximate the semantic operators for first-order logic programs and their fixed points (Hitzler et al. 2004) . Moreover, as shown in Stenning & van Lambalgen (2007) , integrity constraints can be modelled via a form of back-propagation called 'perceptron learning' (Rosenblatt 1962; Rojas 1996). 9 In this framework, any computation on a given minimal model, such as adding a logic program clause (a scenario clause), will somehow bring the network from its initial stable state to another stable state, corresponding to the new minimal model. Nevertheless, if the neural representation proposed in Stenning & van Lambalgen (2007) is approximately correct, there is a large difference in neural activity between, on the one hand, a monotonic extension of a minimal model, and a non-monotonic re-computation of a minimal model on the other. Consider first the case of a monotonic extension as envisaged by our processing model. Retrieving a clause such as (10) from semantic memory, assuming that spill denotes 'spilling coffee on the tablecloth', will result in the activation of a number of units (neurons) which were previously silent; but the activation state of the remaining units, including those representing the goal state (the complete letter), will remain the same. However, retrieving a different clause from semantic memory, for instance (10), where spill now denotes 'spilling coffee on the paper', will result not only in the activation of neurons which were silent but also in the readjustment of the activation patterns of units which were previously active. For instance, the neurons representing the consequent state (the complete letter) will no longer be active. This change in activation is achieved in the neural network by applications of perceptron learning. The difference between monotonic extension and non-monotonic re-computation can thus be found in the occurrence of the readjustment of connection strengths driven by perceptron learning.
These considerations imply that non-monotonic re-computation in (S4) has more drastic consequences for neural processing as compared to the monotonic extension of a minimal model in (S3). We must now show that a processing model based on monotonic semantics does not predict a similar effect. In a strictly monotonic progression of structures, the goal state is necessarily not represented, for otherwise, 9 Multilayer feedforward networks (Hornik et al. 1989 ) and recurrent networks (Schäfer & Zimmermann 2006) can approximate any Borel-measurable function to any desired degree of accuracy. Therefore, despite earlier claims advanced by Levelt (1990) , connectionist networks can approximate arbitrary recursive functions as well, suggesting that they are suited for modelling linguistic processes. The fact that their computational power is restricted to that of finite-state machines (McCulloch & Pitts 1943) , given that the human brain is itself a finite-state machine, adds to their plausibility in psycholinguistics and cognitive science more generally (van der Velde 1993; Petersson 2005) . the model may have to be re-computed, which is not allowed by the monotonic logic underlying the theory. In the Event Calculus framework this means that the predicates and axioms for continuous change are not used, at most those for instantaneous change. Furthermore, because the progression of models is monotonic, one never actually computes minimal models.
10 Under the assumption of monotonicity little semantic computation is going on. In particular (S3) and (S4) will both lead to monotonic extensions of the initial model and both extensions will be computed at the same time, that is when the final verb is processed: in (S3) the update will lead to a model in which (given the results of our entailment questionnaire) the consequent state is represented as being attained, in (S4) it will lead to a model in which the consequent state does not hold. Because there is no principled semantic or processing reason to assume that one final model would be more complex to compute than the other, it follows that a strictly monotonic semantics predicts no difference between the conditions. The re-computation hypothesis can be tested in a dedicated electrophysiological study. Event-related potentials (derived from electroencephalography (EEG) signals) or fields (derived from magnetoencephalography signals) and power changes in specific frequency bands provide direct insights into the complexity and the time course of neural processing, as opposed to reading times and eye movements, which are indirect and cumulative measures of processing load (Luck 2005 ). An EEG study using the materials of our questionnaire as stimuli would be able to determine whether the event-related potentials (ERP) correlate of model re-computation is the N400-the negative shift peaking around 400 ms after the onset of semantically anomalous words (Kutas & Hillyard 1980) , words with lower cloze probabilities (Kutas & Hillyard 1984; Hagoort & Brown 1994) and words which provide information conflicting with the discourse context (van Berkum et al. 1999 (van Berkum et al. , 2003 or world knowledge (Hagoort et al. 2004) . Since the computations underlying these phenomena pertain more to the domain of semantic composition than to the construction of discourse models, re-computation might evoke a different ERP effect. Preliminary data show that the final verb in (S4) elicits a sustained anterior negativity (SAN; thus different from the transient, centro-parietal N400) which is not observed in conditions (S1)-(S3). The amplitude of the anterior negative shift in (S4) is correlated with the number of negative responses in the probe selection task, which is what should be expected if the SAN effect was a brain signature of re-computation: assuming that re-computation evokes a SAN in each (S4) trial in which a negative response is given, the larger the number of negative responses (the larger the number of trials in which re-computation took place), the larger the amplitude of the ERP component revealed by averaging. Current experimental work in our laboratory is aimed at corroborating these findings.
